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High intelligence (general cognitive ability) is fundamental to the human capital that drives
societies in the information age. Understanding the origins of this intellectual capital is important
for government policy, for neuroscience, and for genetics. For genetics, a key question is whether
the genetic causes of high intelligence are qualitatively or quantitatively different from the normal
distribution of intelligence. We report results from a sibling and twin study of high intelligence
and its links with the normal distribution.We identified 360,000 sibling pairs and 9000 twin pairs
from3 million 18-year-oldmaleswith cognitive assessments administered as part of conscription
to military service in Sweden between 1968 and 2010. We found that high intelligence is familial,
heritable, and caused by the same genetic and environmental factors responsible for the normal
distribution of intelligence. High intelligence is a good candidate for “positive genetics” — going
beyond the negative effects of DNA sequence variation on disease and disorders to consider the
positive end of the distribution of genetic effects.
© 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC BY
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/).
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1. Introduction
High intelligence is precious human capital for advancing
andmaintaining society in the information age, as documented
in studies that demonstrate that high intelligence is responsible
for exceptional performance in many societally-valued out-
comes (Kell, Lubinski, & Benbow, 2013; Lubinski, Benbow,
Webb, & Bleske-Rechek, 2006; Rindermann & Thompson,
2011). Understanding the genetic and environmental origins
of high intelligence is crucial for government policy (for
example, for education in the STEM subjects of science,
technology, engineering and mathematics), for neuroscience
(for investigating the high-performance brain), and for genet-
ics. A key question for genetic research is the extent to which
the aetiology of high intelligence differs from the aetiology of
the normal distribution of intelligence. More specifically, do the
same genes affect both high intelligence and the rest of the
distribution to the same extent? It cannot be assumed that the
aetiology of high intelligence is the same. For example, very low
intelligence (severe intellectual disability) differs aetiologically
from the normal distribution, as proposed initially by Lionel
Penrose (1938). In quantitative genetic studies (Nichols, 1984;
Reichenberg et al., in preparation), a critical piece of evidence is
that siblings of individuals with severe intellectual disability
have an average IQ near 100, whereas siblings of those with
mild intellectual disability have an average IQ of around 85,
about one standard deviation below the population mean. In
recent molecular genetic studies, rare non-inherited mutations
appear to be a major source of severe intellectual disability
(Ellison, Rosenfeld, & Shaffer, 2013).
One of the earliest studies in behavioural genetics was
Galton's Hereditary Genius (1869), an analysis of family
pedigrees for brains as well as beauty and brawn. Since there
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was no satisfactory way at the time to measure intelligence,
Galton had to rely on reputation as an index of eminence,
which he found to be highly familial. Since Spearman's (1904)
seminal work on general cognitive ability (g) over a century
ago, research has focused on intelligence as a general factor
that indexes what diverse tests of cognitive abilities have in
common (Jensen, 1998). Intelligence was the target of the first
twin and adoption studies in the 1920s (Burks, 1928; Freeman,
Holzinger, &Mitchell, 1928;Merriman, 1924; Theis, 1924), and
continues to be among the most studied traits in behavioural
genetics (Plomin, DeFries, Knopik, & Neiderhiser, 2013).
For these reasons, it is surprising that few behavioural
genetic studies have focused on high intelligence (Plomin &
Haworth, 2009). We review these studies below, but we begin
with hypotheses about why genetic and environmental
factors might differ for high intelligence (the Discontinuity
Hypothesis), and why the results might be similar (the
Continuity Hypothesis).
2. The Discontinuity Hypothesis
The Discontinuity Hypothesis posits different environmen-
tal and genetic aetiologies for high intelligence in contrast to
the rest of the distribution (Petrill, Kovas, Hart, Thompson, &
Plomin, 2009). Although the evidence showing substantial
heritability for the normal distribution of intelligence is one of
the most consistently documented findings in the behavioural
sciences (Deary, Johnson, & Houlihan, 2009), researchers in the
field of expert training have argued that “differences in early
experiences, preferences, opportunities, habits, training, and
practice are the real determinants of excellence” (Howe,
Davidson, & Sloboda, 1998, p. 403). A recent special issue of
the journal Intelligence examines this environmental view of
the acquisition of expertise (Detterman, 2014), including its
relationship to genetic research (Plomin, Shakeshaft, McMillan,
& Trzaskowski, 2014). Although the critical importance of
deliberate practice is most often considered in the domain of
specialist skills such as games, arts and sports, intelligence is
also sometimes viewed as acquired expertise rather than
inherited talent (Sternberg, 1999). If one accepts the over-
whelming evidence showing substantial heritability for varia-
tion in the normal range of intelligence, the expert training
position would suggest a discontinuity in the sense that it
assumes that excellence is primarily due to environmental
factors. Quantitative genetic research such as the twin method
can test this hypothesis by investigating whether environ-
mental influence is more important for high intelligence as
compared to the rest of the distribution. Another more subtle
environmental source of discontinuity can also be tested: the
hypothesis that “differences in early experiences” are especially
important for excellence would lead to the prediction that
shared environment – environmental factors that make family
members similar – should be greater for high intelligence.
Genetic reasons for discontinuity are also plausible, begin-
ningwith the folkwisdom that there could be “genes for genius.”
Themost persuasive case for genetic discontinuity for genius has
beenmade byDavid Lykken (1998). He notes that a key problem
of genius is “its mysterious irrepressibility and its ability to arise
from the most unpromising of lineages and to flourish even in
the meanest of circumstances” (p. 29). He proposed that genius
emerges from unique combinations of genes; he referred to
these higher-order nonadditive (epistatic) interactions as
emergenic (Lykken, 1982, 2006). The emergenesis hypothesis
does not necessarily predict that different genes affect high
intelligence, but it does predict that genetic effects are
nonadditive for high intelligence. The hallmark of an epistatic
trait is one for which identical twins, who share all their genes,
are more than twice as similar as fraternal twins and other
first-degree relatives, who share on average 50% of their
segregating genes. The twin design can test this hypothesis
that nonadditive genetic effects are greater for high intelligence
as well as testing the “genes for genius” hypothesis that
different genes are responsible for high intelligence.
For both environmental and genetic discontinuity hypothe-
ses, a crucial issue is the cut-off used to define high ability. If the
cut-off is extremely high, scientific research gives way to case
studies, as has been recently avowed by a leader in research
on expert training, who advocated case studies of the “less
than a handful of individuals… with the very highest levels of
performance” (Ericsson, 2014). In genetics, too, there is interest
in the very highest levels of performance. For example, Galton
benchmarked the top 1 in a million (.0001%) as “illustrious” and
the top 250 in amillion (.025%) as “eminent” (Galton, 1869), and
Lykken referred to “genius” althoughhedidnot suggest a specific
cut-off. Such extreme cut-offs are beyond the reach of quantita-
tive genetics research or gene-hunting research, both of which
require large sample sizes. However, once genes accounting for
at least a few percent of the variance at any level of performance
are identified, they can be used with adequate power as a
polygenic score in research on even “a handful of individuals
with the very highest levels of performance” (Plomin & Deary,
2014). This is beginning to happen in the world of elite athletic
performance where, contrary to the Discontinuity Hypothesis,
the same genes appear to be associated additively with both
ordinary and extraordinary performance (Epstein, 2013).
3. The Continuity Hypothesis
The Continuity Hypothesis posits that high performance is
the quantitative extreme of the same environmental and genetic
factors responsible for the rest of the normal distribution. From
an environmental perspective, the prodigious practice and
concentrated effort of high performers might be only quantita-
tively (e.g., number of hours of deliberate practice) but not
qualitatively different from the factors responsible for the rest of
the distribution. In terms of genetics, the Continuity Hypothesis
is the foundation for quantitative genetic theory (Fisher, 1918). If
multiple genes affect a trait, their joint effects are distributed
as a normal bell-shaped curve, which means that the same
genes affect the low and high extremes of such polygenic
traits. Molecular genetic research has begun to confirm this
polygenic prediction as genes are identified that contribute to
the heritability of complex dimensions and disorders (Plomin,
Haworth, & Davis, 2009). For example, genes identified by their
association with obesity are associated with body weight
throughout the distribution of weight (Speliotes et al., 2010).
4. Quantitative genetic analysis of high intelligence
When genes associated with intelligence are identified,
they will provide a strong competitive test of these two
hypotheses by assessing the extent to which genes
124 N.G. Shakeshaft et al. / Intelligence 48 (2015) 123–132
associated with normal variation in intelligence are also
associated with high intelligence and vice versa. Until that
time, quantitative genetic methods such as the twin design can
be used to compare the hypotheses. Quantitative genetic
analyses have an advantage overmolecular genetic approaches
in terms of investigating environmental as well as genetic
sources of continuity and discontinuity. For example, a twin
study can test whether shared environmental influence is
greater for high intelligence.
There are several ways that the twinmethod can be used to
investigate whether genetic and environmental influences
differ for high intelligence as compared to the rest of the
distribution. These methods are described in greater detail in
Methods section, but we introduce them here because of their
relevance for reviewing previous studies of high intelligence.
One set of methods uses a dichotomous “diagnosis” of high
intelligence (case) or not (control). Monozygotic (MZ) and
dizygotic (DZ) twin concordances can be compared to estimate
genetic and environmental influence on high intelligence. Such
dichotomous data are often analysed using a liability–threshold
model, which assumes that liability is distributed normally
until a threshold is exceeded, even though the analysis is based
on dichotomous data (Rijsdijk & Sham, 2002). If the only
available data were a “diagnosis” of high intelligence, the
liability–threshold model is a useful way of assuming an
underlying continuous liability despite having assessed a
dichotomy.
Analysing high intelligence as a dichotomy loses much
informationwhen intelligence in the “cases” and “controls” has
been assessed as a continuum. A method called DeFries–Fulker
(DF) extremes analysis (DeFries & Fulker, 1985, 1988; DeFries,
Fulker, & LaBuda, 1987) makes use of such quantitative trait
data in estimating the genetic and environmental origins of the
mean difference between the high intelligence group and the
rest of the population. For this reason, heritability from DF
extremes analysis is called group heritability to distinguish it
from the usual estimate of heritability, which could be called
individual differences heritability because it refers to genetic
influence on individual differences throughout the distribution.
Importantly, DF extremes analysis broaches the issue of the
extent towhich the same genes affect high intelligence and the
rest of the distribution, as explained in Methods section.
5. Previous studies of high intelligence
Twin studies of high intelligence in childhood (Petrill et al.,
1997; Plomin & Thompson, 1993; Ronald, Spinath, & Plomin,
2002) and in adulthood (Saudino, Plomin, Pedersen, &
McClearn, 1994) have generally used DF extremes analysis
and reported results consistentwith the ContinuityHypothesis,
in that group heritability was similar to individual differences
heritability. However, the high-intelligence groups in these
studies were small, just a few dozen pairs of twins, with the
exception of one study (Ronald et al., 2002) which was limited
by the age of the sample (2–4 years) and the measure (ratings
of intelligence by parents). Low power to detect differences in
heritability biases results in favour of the Continuity Hypothesis.
Other studies have investigated the heritability of individual
differences within high-intelligence groups, or asked more
generally whether heritability differs across the population as
a function of level of intelligence (Thompson, Detterman, &
Plomin, 1993). However, such analyses address why one highly
intelligent person is slightly more or less intelligent than
another highly intelligent person, rather than askingwhy highly
intelligent individuals as a group differ from the rest of the
population.
In response to the neglect of research on high intelligence,
the Genetics of High Cognitive Abilities (GHCA) Consortium
was formed to bring together intelligence data on 11,000 twin
pairs for the purpose of enabling an adequately powered
comparison between high intelligence and the normal distri-
bution. Liability–threshold model-fitting yielded evidence
supporting the Continuity Hypothesis because estimates of
genetic influence did not differ for high intelligence (0.50 with
a 95% confidence interval of 0.41 to 0.60) and the entire sample
(0.55; 0.51–0.59) (Haworth, Dale, & Plomin, 2009; Haworth
et al., 2009). The overlapping confidence intervals suggest that
heritability from the liability–threshold model in the high-
intelligence group does not differ significantly from individual
differences heritability. Estimates of shared environmental
influence were also similar: 0.28 (0.19–0.37) for high intelli-
gence and 0.21 (0.17–0.25) for the entire sample. However, the
large confidence intervals for the high-intelligence group
indicate that replication is needed to confirm the Continuity
Hypothesis.
Finding similar heritabilities for high intelligence and the
rest of the distribution does not confirm that the same genes
are involved, which is the strength of DF extremes analysis.
Moreover, in the GHCA study, only the top 15% were selected
and the sample came from six twin studies each using different
measures, in four countries, with awide age range (6–71 years).
6. The present study
In contrast to the GHCA study, the present study used a
higher cut-off (5%). It included non-twin siblings as well as
twins. The samplewas drawn from a single population andwas
assessed at the same age (18 years) on the same battery of
cognitive measures, and the data were analysed with multiple
methods including DF extremes analysis. Using a general factor
from cognitive assessments of 3 million 18-year-old males
administered as part of compulsory military service in Sweden
between 1968 and 2010, we identified 370,000 sibling pairs
and 9000 twin pairs. We selected the highest-scoring (top 5%)
non-twin siblings and twins in order to investigate the
familiality and heritability of high intelligence and its links to
the normal distribution.
7. Methods
7.1. Sample
We tested the Continuity Hypothesis using cognitive
assessments administered as part of military service in
Sweden, from 1968 to 2010. Conscription was compulsory for
males in Sweden until 2009, excluding those with severely
disabling physical or psychiatric disorders, and achieved
approximately 98% participation: 3 million 18-year-old males.
From these, 363,905 families were identified containing at least
two conscripted male siblings born in Sweden. From each
family, we selected one twin pair if present (the youngest, if the
family contained more than one pair); if there were no twins,
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we selected the twomale siblings closest to one another in age
(the youngest, again, if two such pairs had the same age
difference). These selections were made using the Swedish
Multi-Generation Register, which includes all individuals born
in Sweden since 1932 or living in Sweden since 1961. The
resulting data set comprised 3039monozygotic (MZ) and 3196
dizygotic (DZ) twin pairs, 2780 twin pairs of unknown
zygosity, and 354,890 pairs of non-twin brothers. The vast
majority (96.7%) of the non-twin sibling pairs were separated
in age by less than 2 years.
7.2. Measures
General cognitive ability was assessed with the Swedish
Enlistment Battery (SEB), administered as part of the military
conscription testing. Three different versions of the SEB were
used during the 40-year period for which cognitive data were
available: the SEB67 during the years 1970–1979, the SEB80
during 1980–1993, and the CAT-SEB during 1994–2009
(Carlstedt, 2000). The SEB67 and SEB80 were paper and pencil
tests consisting of four subtests assessing verbal, visuospatial,
technical and inductive abilities, which were summed to derive
a measure for general cognitive ability. High internal consisten-
cy for the SEB80 has been reported (coefficient α = .79–.91)
(Carlstedt & Mårdberg, 1993). Due to theoretical and method-
ological developments in intelligence research and the advent of
the personal computer, a new version of the SEB (CAT-SEB),
utilising computer-aided testing, was launched in 1994. The
CAT-SEB was based on a three-level hierarchical model of
cognitive abilities and included 12 tests, of which 10 were used
to form the latent general ability factor, plus secondary factors of
crystallised intelligence and general visualisation. The reliability
of the CAT-SEB tests is also good (coefficient α = .70–.85)
(Mårdberg & Carlstedt, 1998). The general cognitive ability
variable, available from the Conscription Register and based on
the different versions of the SEB, was measured on a stanine
scale, i.e., a normally-distributed variable divided into nine
levels (higher scores indicating greater ability), with amean of 5
and standard deviation of 2.
7.3. Analyses
In addition to traditional individual differences analyses
of the entire sample of twins and non-twin siblings (Plomin
et al., 2013), two types of analysis were used for high
intelligence: liability–threshold model-fitting using dichot-
omous data (high intelligence versus normal-range intelli-
gence), andDeFries–Fulker (DF) extremes analysis, inwhich an
“extreme” (or proband) group is selected (high-intelligence
individuals, in this case), and quantitative variation in their
siblings or co-twins is analysed. We begin with a brief
description of other ways that have been used to analyse data
of this type.
One general approach is to test for an interaction across the
population between heritability (and environmental parameter
estimates) and level of intelligence (Cherny, Cardon, Fulker, &
DeFries, 1992; Logan et al., 2012). However, because there are
relatively few individuals of high intelligence in the population,
testing for an interaction throughout the entire population has
little power to detect a difference in heritability specifically for
high intelligence. Low power to detect interactions biases this
approach in favour of the Continuity Hypothesis.
A more focused approach is to compare heritability for a
high-intelligence group and an unselected group. A methodo-
logical problem with this apparently straightforward approach
is that the variance of a high-intelligence group is restricted
because they are highly selected, and this is likely to affect twin
correlations. An important conceptual problem is that the focus
of traditional heritability estimates is on individual differences.
For understanding the origins of high intelligence, the issue is
not whether one highly intelligent person is slightly more or
less intelligent than another highly intelligent person, which is
what is assessed in traditional heritability estimates. Instead,
we are interested in the genetic and environmental causes of
high intelligence — why highly intelligent individuals as a
group differ from the rest of the population.
7.4. Liability–threshold model-ﬁtting
The dichotomous data – high intelligence versus the rest of
the distribution – can be analysed by comparing the degree of
concordance for MZ and DZ twins, and for non-twin siblings.
Here, we used probandwise concordance: the proportion of
“affected” individuals (i.e., those with a stanine score of 9, in
this case) who have a twin or sibling who is also affected. This
method indicates morbidity risk, i.e., the probability that a
sibling or co-twin of someone in the high-intelligence group
will also be in that group.
Liability–threshold models assume that liability is normally
distributed, but with the “disorder” (membership of the high-
intelligence group, in this case) occurring only when a certain
threshold is reached. Tetrachoric twin correlations and thresh-
olds were calculated from our dichotomous data (Falconer,
1965; Smith, 1974), and liability–threshold (and all other)
model-fitting analyses were conducted using OpenMx (Boker
et al., 2011). This model-fitting produces ACE estimates
analogous to those produced by twin model-fitting for
continuous data, but the heritability estimate is the heritability
of a hypothetical continuous liability construct, derived from
the dichotomous data.
7.5. DeFries–Fulker (DF) extremes analysis
Analysing continuous data as dichotomous loses a great deal
of information. Here, intelligence is assessed as a continuous
stanine (standardised, nine-point) score, so much more infor-
mation is available than the dichotomised “diagnosis” of high
intelligence assessed by liability–threshold modelling.
We can use these continuous data to estimate the genetic
and environmental origins of themean difference between the
high-intelligence group and the rest of the distribution, using
DF extremes analysis (DeFries & Fulker, 1985, 1988; DeFries
et al., 1987). This technique assesses the degree to which the
co-twins or siblings of the extreme (high intelligence) group
regress to the population mean. If the co-twin/sibling mean
differs from the populationmean, the trait is familial. Further, if
the mean for MZ twins regresses less than that for DZ twins
(and non-twin siblings), this indicates genetic influence on the
mean difference between the high-intelligence group and the
rest of the population.
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In DF extremes analysis, the trait scores are standardised
and transformed to account for the mean differences between
the MZ and DZ groups, then fitted to the regression equation:
C = β1P + β2R + A. C is the predicted score for the co-twin;
P, the proband score; R, the coefficient of genetic relatedness
(1.0 for MZ twins, 0.5 for DZ twins and non-twin siblings)
and A, the regression constant. β1 is the partial regression of the
co-twin score on the proband score, and represents the average
twin resemblance, independent of β2. β2 is the partial
regression of the co-twin score on R independent of β1, and is
equal to double the difference between the MZ and DZ co-twin
means (adjusted for any differences between MZ and DZ
probands). Dividing β2 by the difference between the proband
and population means provides the “group heritability,” the
proportion of the difference between the proband and
population phenotypic means that is genetic in origin. (This
should be contrasted against the usual heritability estimates
produced by traditional twin model fitting analyses, which
represent the genetic influence on individual differences, rather
than the influence on the mean difference between probands
and the rest of the population.)
A finding of group heritability indicates that both the
extreme trait and the rest of the distribution are heritable.
Importantly, however, it also indicates that the genetic
contributions in both cases are not independent from one
another: the group heritability for two heritable but unrelated
traits would be zero (Plomin & Kovas, 2005). In effect, DF
extremes is a bivariate analysis: in this case, between the
extreme score and the rest of the quantitative dimension.
Finding substantial group heritability thus indicates not only
that both the dimensional trait and its quantitative extreme are
heritable, but also that they are influenced in part by the same
genes: extreme scores are not qualitatively distinct from the
rest of the distribution.
8. Results
This study assessed the genetic architecture of high
intelligence. We present the results of classical twin model-
fitting for the whole distribution of intelligence. For high
intelligence vs. the rest of the distribution, we present twin and
sibling pair concordances, liability–threshold model-fitting
analyses of dichotomous twin data, and DF extremes analyses
incorporating quantitative twin data. First, we provide descrip-
tive results and a simple representation of the familiality of
high intelligence.
8.1. Descriptive statistics
Fig. 1 shows the distribution of stanine scores for intelli-
gence for the total sample described above, selecting one
sibling at random from each pair. As indicated, the data are
normally distributed (mean = 5.16, SD = 1.94), with 5% of
individuals achieving the highest possible stanine score (9),
corresponding to an IQ above 125. The siblings of these
probands were selected, comprising a sample of 185 MZ
twins, 196 DZ twins, and 28,339 non-twin siblings.
The aim of this study is to estimate the genetic and
environmental influences accounting for the difference
(amounting to 1.98 standard deviations) between the highest
scoring individuals and the population mean. As explained
above, we are not concerned with the individual differences
between the highest scoring individuals themselves (which
cannot be assessed in any case, as only stanine scores are
available for this sample), but rather with the differences
between this group as a whole and the rest of the population.
For subsequent analyses, to account for any changes in
population mean intelligence over time, the raw stanine scores
were regressed on year of birth, and standardised.
8.2. Individual differences (whole twin sample)
Before exploring the differences between the high-
intelligence group and the rest of the population, the twin
sample as a whole was analysed to confirm the validity and
representativeness of these data and to provide a comparison
for the analysis of high intelligence. The correlation between
scores for MZ twins was 0.80, and for DZ twins 0.51, which
suggests heritability of 0.58 for intelligence in this sample (by
doubling the difference between these correlations to produce
a rough estimate) and is inconsistent with nonadditive genetic
effects (as the MZ correlation is less than double the DZ
Fig. 1. Distribution of intelligence scores. N= 363,905, mean = 5.16, SD= 1.94. Data shown include one randomly-selected individual per sibling pair. The highest-
scoring individuals (stanine 9) are highlighted (N= 16,058).
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correlation). More rigorous estimates, produced by univariate
ACE twin model-fitting, are presented in Table 1. This analysis
partitions variance in the sample's scores into additive genetic
(A), shared environmental (C) and non-shared environmental
(E) components.
These results, suggesting substantial genetic influence, with
environmental influences evenly divided between shared and
non-shared effects, correspond very closely to those typically
found in the literature for participants of this age (Haworth
et al., 2010). This suggests that these data are in linewith those
obtained by other studies.
8.3. Familiality of high intelligence
The familiality of high intelligence can be observed simply
by comparing themean scores of the non-twin siblings of high-
intelligence probands to the population mean.
As shown in Fig. 2, high intelligence, defined as the highest
5% of scores, is highly familial. For siblings of probands
(i.e., those with a standardised score of 1.98, equivalent to a
raw stanine score of 9), the distribution of intelligence is shifted
sharply to the right of that of the rest of the population, with a
mean score (0.81) approximately halfway between the
proband score and the population mean (0). These results
suggest a sibling “group correlation” (the ratio between the
siblings' deviation from the population mean to the probands'
deviation from the population mean) of 0.41. In other words,
almost half of the difference between high intelligence and the
rest of the population is familial in origin.
Familiality could be due to genetic or environmental
influences. However, the twin data presented in Fig. 3
indicates that the familial effect is substantially genetic in
origin. The mean for DZ twins of probands (0.95) does not
differ substantially from that of non-twin siblings, as shown
in Fig. 1. In contrast, MZ co-twins have a substantially higher
mean score (1.39) than that of DZs, suggesting a strong
genetic association.
More rigorous and specific results can be obtained, as
described below.
8.4. Dichotomous data: Concordances
Table 2 presents twin/sibling concordances for the high-
intelligence MZ twin, DZ twin and non-twin sibling groups.
For the 28,339 selected non-twin sibling pairs, there were
6604 individuals in 3302 concordant pairs, and 50,074
individuals in 25,037 discordant pairs. Simple (pairwise)
concordance is thus 12% (i.e., 3302/28339, the proportion of
pairs that are concordant). However, probandwise concor-
dance is a better measure, since it indicates morbidity risk. For
these siblings, probandwise concordance is 21% (i.e., (2*3302)/
((2*3302)+ 25037)), which is the probability that the twin or
sibling of a proband will also be a proband. These results
indicate substantial familiality for high intelligence.
For twins, the same calculations indicate probandwise
concordance of 45% for MZ twins, and 25% for DZ twins. In
other words, there is a 45% probability that the MZ twin of an
individual in the high intelligence group will also be in that
Table 1
Model-ﬁtting results for whole twin sample. Results are additive genetic (A), shared environmental (C) and residual (E; i.e., non-shared environment and error)
components of variance, with 95% conﬁdence intervals.
Variance components (95% conﬁdence intervals) Sample (numbers of pairs)
A C E MZ DZ
0.58 (0.53–0.63) 0.22 (0.17–0.27) 0.20 (0.19–0.21) 3039 3196
Fig. 2. Familiality of high intelligence. Male siblings of high-intelligence probands (with a standardised score of 1.98) have significantly and substantially higher
intelligence (mean = 0.81, SD = 0.81, N= 28,339) than the population (mean = 0, SD= 1, N= 727,810).
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group (and 25% for a DZ twin). Doubling the difference
between the MZ and DZ concordances would suggest herita-
bility of 0.40 — but as these concordances do not take account
of population base rates, this is not entirely appropriate
statistically. Tetrachoric and group correlations (presented
below) are preferable for this reason.
All subsequent analyses (tetrachoric correlations, liability–
threshold model-fitting and DF extremes analysis) were con-
ducted using the full twin sample of 6235 pairs.
8.5. Dichotomous data: Liability–threshold model-ﬁtting
As discussed in Methods, dichotomous data liability–
threshold modelling may be used to analyse dichotomous
data, assuming that liability (i.e., the “risk” of high intelligence,
in this case) is normally distributed, but a certain threshold
must be exceeded for an individual to become a proband. The
liability–threshold model is based on twin tetrachoric correla-
tions, which are presented in Table 3.
These tetrachoric correlations, derived from dichotomous
data, may be analysed in the same way as twin correlations
from continuous data. For example, doubling the difference
between the MZ and DZ correlations suggests heritability of
0.44 for high intelligence. As with the twin correlations for the
whole distribution, these results do not suggest the existence of
nonadditive genetic effects. Liability–threshold model-fitting
provides a more rigorous analysis. Results are presented in
Table 4.
These results suggest substantial heritability (0.42), with
environmental influences divided between shared and non-
shared effects. All of these variance components were signifi-
cant, and an analysis of sub-models (eliminating variance
components and testing the decrease in fit to the data)
indicated that this full model best fit the data. As noted in
Methods, however, these results refer to the variance of a
hypothetical construct of continuous liability for high intelli-
gence, derived from the dichotomous data, rather than that of a
quantitative, continuous measure of intelligence.
8.6. Continuous data: DeFries–Fulker (DF) extremes analysis
As shown in Fig. 3, MZ co-twins of those in the high
intelligence group regress to the population mean to a much
smaller extent than do DZ co-twins, suggesting genetic
influence. As discussed in Methods, DF extremes analysis uses
continuous data, and can estimate the genetic and environ-
mental factors influencing the difference in mean intelligence
between the two intelligence groups (high intelligence vs. the
rest of the population), by quantifying the differential regres-
sion to the mean for MZ and DZ co-twins of probands.
Fig. 3. Heritability of high intelligence. Male MZ co-twins of high-intelligence probands (with a standardised score of 1.98) have significantly and substantially higher
intelligence (mean= 1.39, SD= 0.58, N= 185) than DZ co-twins (mean= 0.95, SD = 0.75, N= 196), who in turn score significantly and substantially higher than
the population (mean = 0, SD= 1, N= 727,810).
Table 2
Concordances. Concordance is shown both pairwise (the proportion of
concordant pairs) and probandwise (the proportion of probands whose twin/
sibling is also a proband).
Number of pairs Concordance
Total Concordant Discordant Pairwise Probandwise
MZ twins 185 54 131 0.29 0.45
DZ twins 196 28 168 0.14 0.25
Non-twin
siblings
28,339 3302 25,037 0.12 0.21
Table 3
Tetrachoric correlations. N = 6235 twin pairs.
Tetrachoric correlation
(95% conﬁdence interval)
Std. error
MZ twins 0.78 (0.71–0.84) 0.05
DZ twins 0.56 (0.45–0.66) 0.08
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The process can be illustrated without using model-fitting,
as shown above for non-twin siblings (“Familiality of High
Intelligence”). Whereas a conventional twin correlation refers
to individual differences on a trait, a “group” correlation
quantifies the mean difference between the extreme group
(i.e., the high intelligence group, here) and the rest of the
population (Plomin, 1991). This may be calculated as the ratio
between the two groups' differences from themean, i.e., that of
the probands and that of their co-twins. (In animal selection
studies, these are known as the “selection differential” and
“response to selection,” respectively; Plomin et al., 2014.) For
these data, this yields group correlations of 0.70 for MZ twins,
and 0.48 for DZ twins. Doubling the difference between these
group correlations estimates group heritability at 0.44, sug-
gesting that almost half of the mean difference between the
high intelligence group and the rest of the population is
explained genetically.
DF extremes model-fitting is preferable, because it uses the
full twin data set (6235 pairs), and does not rely on randomly
selecting one member of each concordant pair. It would also
take into account any mean differences between MZ and DZ
probands, although there are nonewith these stanine data. The
DF extremes model-fitting results are presented in Table 5.
The DF extremes group heritability estimate (0.40) is
similar to that estimated using the simpler group method
above, and to the liability–threshold model-fitting results. The
close approximation between the DF extremes and liability–
threshold model-fitting results suggests that the assumptions
of the latter are correct (Plomin & Kovas, 2005).
As with the previous analyses using dichotomous data, the
DF extremes results indicate that just under half of the mean
difference between the high intelligence group and the rest of
the population is explained genetically, with the remaining
variance divided between shared and non-shared environ-
mental influences.
9. Discussion
These results provide strong support for the Continuity
Hypothesis. Familial resemblance from non-twin sibling anal-
yses and heritabilities from twin analyses were similar for high
intelligence and for the rest of the distribution, using concor-
dances, liability–threshold analysis, and DF extremes analysis.
As explained earlier, DF extremes analysis not only indicates
substantial heritability of high intelligence and of individual
differences in intelligence in the normal distribution but also
suggests substantial genetic correlation between them. Impor-
tantly, our twin results are highly similar to the results of the
only other large twin study of high intelligence (GHCA;
Haworth, Wright, et al., 2009).
For these reasons, we conclude that high intelligence is
familial, heritable, and caused by the same genetic factors
responsible for the normal distribution of intelligence. Stated
more provocatively, high intelligence as we defined it appears
to be nothing more than the quantitative extreme of the same
genetic factors responsible for normal variation.
We found no support for the genetic Discontinuity
Hypothesis that nonadditive genetic variance is greater for
high intelligence, as suggested by the emergenesis hypothesis
(Lykken, 1982, 2006). There was no evidence for nonadditive
genetic variance for either high intelligence or for the entire
sample, which is similar to GHCA results. One caveat concerns
assortative mating. Assortative mating is much greater for
intelligence (spouse correlations ~0.40) than for personality
(spouse correlations ~0.10) or for physical characteristics such
as height and weight (~0.20) (Plomin & Deary, 2014). In twin
studies such as ours and GHCA that do not also include parental
data, nonadditive genetic variance could be masked by
assortative mating, and there is some evidence that this is the
case for intelligence (Vinkhuyzen, van der Sluis, Maes, &
Posthuma, 2012). If assortative mating were similar for high
intelligence and the entire sample, it would not affect the
interpretation of our results, which are based solely on the twin
design. However, if assortative mating were greater for high
intelligence, this could mask greater nonadditive genetic
variance for high intelligence (Vinkhuyzen et al., 2012). We
are not aware of any studies that have investigated whether
assortative mating differs as a function of level of intelligence.
9.1. Environmental and genetic discontinuity
The GHCA study found a trend supporting the environmen-
tal Discontinuity Hypothesis, in that shared family environ-
mental influence was somewhat greater for high intelligence.
In the GHCA study, shared environment was estimated at 28%
in the high intelligence group using liability–threshold model-
ling and 21% in the entire sample, although the difference was
not nearly significant (95% confidence intervals were 0.19–0.37
and 0.17–0.25, respectively). In the present study, the results
were 36% for high intelligence and 22% for the entire sample,
with the difference again non-significant. The shared environ-
mental estimate for high intelligence from DF extremes
analysis was similar in the present study (37%), although DF
extremes analysis is less comparable to the other analyses. The
confidence intervals overlap substantially for all of these
comparisons.
For these reasons, we conclude that high intelligence is
caused by the same environmental factors responsible for the
normal distribution of intelligence. However, it should be
mentioned that the Continuity Hypothesis is essentially a null
hypothesis of no difference between high intelligence and the
normal distribution. Caution is warranted because insufficient
power biases results in favour of the Continuity Hypothesis.
Nonetheless, the similarity of results from the GHCA studywith
11,000 twin pairs and the present study with 9000 twin pairs
Table 4
Liability–threshold model-ﬁtting results. Results are additive genetic (A),
shared environmental (C) and residual (E; i.e., non-shared environment and
error) components of variance. N = 6235 twin pairs.
Variance components (95% conﬁdence intervals)
A C E
0.42 (0.17–0.68) 0.36 (0.12–0.57) 0.22 (0.16–0.30)
Table 5
DF extremes model-ﬁtting results. Results are additive genetic (A), shared
environmental (C) and residual (E; i.e., non-shared environment and error)
components of variance. N = 6235 twin pairs.
Group ACE components (95% conﬁdence intervals)
A C E
0.40 (0.28–0.52) 0.37 (0.27–0.46) 0.23 (0.19–0.27)
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affords strong, if not definitive, support for the Continuity
Hypothesis.
Asmentioned in Introduction, an important qualification for
all of these conclusions is that more extreme cut-offs might
yield different results. The GHCA study selected the top 15% of
the distribution (although a case-control study with more
extreme cut-offs is underway; Spain et al., in preparation), and
the present study the top 5%. These cut-offs balance sample size
and power. Twin studies are unlikely to reach adequate power
using Galton's (1869) cut-offs of .025% for “eminent” and
.0001% for “illustrious.” If 1% of births are twins, a population of
80 millionwould be needed to obtain amere 200 pairs of twins
above the .025% cut-off. However, molecular genetic studies
could be useful even for extreme cut-offs, in part because they
do not require special populations such as twins.
9.2. Positive genetics
Nothing would advance genetic research on intelligence
more than identifying some of the genes responsible for its
substantial heritability. We now know that many genes of very
small effect are responsible for the heritability of intelligence,
as is the case for all common disorders and complex
dimensions in the life sciences (Plomin & Deary, 2014).
Nonetheless a polygenic score that adds up the effects of
many genes of small effect size would provide a strong test of
the prediction from the Continuity Hypothesis that genes
associated with normal variation in intelligence will also be
associated with high intelligence. It could also be used to test
the Continuity Hypothesis for very high cut-offs.
If the Continuity Hypothesis is correct, high intelligence
represents thepositive endof a normal distribution. In contrast,
most genome-wide association research has focused on the
negative effects of genes on disorders, diseases, and disabilities
(Visscher, Brown, McCarthy, & Yang, 2012). For intelligence,
the problematic end of the distribution has also become a focus
of research, as rare non-inherited mutations are emerging as a
major source of severe intellectual disability (Ellison et al.,
2013). Genetic exploration of the positive tail of normally
distributed traits such as high intelligence is important
conceptually because it moves away from the notion that we
are all the same genetically except for rogue mutations that
cause disorders, diseases and disabilities. The term positive
genetics has been used to highlight genetic research on the
positive end of distributions (Plomin et al., 2009).
The normal phenotypic distribution of intelligence makes
it an obvious target for investigating the positive as well
as negative extremes. Another possibly important feature of
intelligence is that, like athletic ability, it is assessed asmaximal
performance, in contrast to other behavioural domains such as
psychopathology and personality that involve typical behav-
iour. However, the larger significance of positive genetics is that
these phenotypic considerations about the positive pole of the
normal distribution have far-reaching implications for geno-
mics. Polygenic scores created from genome-wide association
studies are normally distributed, for disorders as well as for
dimensions. In other words, polygenic scores have a positive
pole with just as many people as the negative pole, even
though the spotlight is typically on the negative end of
the distribution of genetic “risk.” This normal distribution of
polygenic scores implies that at the level of DNA variation there
are no common disorders, only normally distributed quantita-
tive traits (Plomin et al., 2009).
Positive genetics and the Continuity Hypothesis have
practical as well as conceptual implications for intelligence,
for example, for identifying genes associated with intelligence.
Rather than using the brute force strategy of getting ever-larger
samples of unselected individuals to narrow the “missing
heritability” gap (Plomin & Simpson, 2013), selecting individ-
uals of high intelligencemight increase power for gene-hunting
based on the simple hypothesis that high-intelligence individ-
uals are enriched for intelligence-enhancing alleles and harbour
few intelligence-depleting alleles. In other words, intellectual
development can be disrupted by any and many mutations,
including non-inherited (de novo) mutations, but high intelli-
gence requires that everything works correctly. This hypothesis
provided the rationale for a genome-wide case-control associ-
ation study for caseswith extremely high intelligence (IQ N150)
compared to unselected control individuals (Spain et al., in
preparation). However, in an initial report, this design does not
appear to have found richer results either for identifying
individual DNA variants, or for genomic approaches such as
comparing the total number of rare variants (which generally
have negative effects and might be expected to occur less
frequently in the high-intelligence sample). Nonetheless, it is
early days for the use of high-intelligence samples to increase
power for gene-hunting.
Positive genetics raises the question: who are the people at
the positive end of the polygenic distribution of “risk” for
disorders?Are theymerely individuals at low risk for problems,
or do they have unusual positive traits? Thinking positively
begins by thinking quantitatively — about “dimensions” rather
than “disorders” and about genetic “variability” rather than
genetic “risk.” Intelligence makes it easy to think positively.
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